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Abstract
This paper studies the question to what extent premia for macroeconomic
risks in banking are sufficient to avoid banking crises. We investigate a com-
petitive banking system embedded in an overlapping generation model subject
to repeated macroeconomic shocks. We show that even if banks fully incorpo-
rate macroeconomic risks in their pricing of loans, a banking system may enter
bankruptcy with a probability of one. A major cause for this default is that risk
premia of a competitive banking system may become too small if the capital base
is low.
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1 Introduction
Severe banking crises are ubiquitous in our times. A banking crisis occurs when a large
number of banks fail to meet regulatory capital requirements or are even illiquid or
insolvent. The causes of most banking crises can be attributed to negative macroeco-
nomic shocks, including their amplification mechanisms. The crises in Latin America
of the 1980s and early 1990s, in East Asia later that decade, and the more prolonged
stagnation in Japan, for example, were to a large extent caused by negative macroeco-
nomic events, cf. Borio (2003). The devastating effects of banking crises on economies,
including budgetary consequences of possible government bail-outs, has brought the
problem of optimal policy design to the top of the international policy agenda.
Any design of policies in banking and managing banking crises must start from the
fundamental question to what extent a banking system is capable of protecting itself
against macroeconomic risks and thus against financial instabilities. The widespread
occurrence of banking crises suggests that this protection might be generally too weak.
However, it is conceptually unclear why this is the case. This paper addresses this
fundamental question from a macroeconomic perspective and suggests an answer.
We study a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations in which
financial intermediaries solve agency problems between saving agents and investing
entrepreneurs. In each period, the repayment of entrepreneurs is subject to macroe-
conomic shocks. We assume that the banking system is competitive. Free exit and
free entry ensure that return on bank capital is equal to alternative investment oppor-
tunities. Free exit and entry determine the price for macroeconomic risks, which is
reflected by the risk premium of loans.
After establishing the existence of equilibria with financial intermediation, our paper
provides two insights into a competitive banking system’s vulnerability to macroeco-
nomic shocks. First, banks charge premia for macroeconomic risks that depend on the
capital base. In particular, when the capital base of the banking system is small, risk
premia also become small. At the limit when bank capital is zero, the risk premium
vanishes. As a consequence, a banking system with low capital is more vulnerable to
a further decline of capital than a system with high capital.
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Second, if aggregate equity is below a critical level, the banking system will default
with certainty in finite time. The reason for this is a vicious circle. Repeated negative
macroeconomic shocks lower the equity of banks. As risk premia decrease, the like-
lihood of further declines of bank capital increases. This acceleration of a downward
spiral in bank capital constitutes the essence of our finding that the banking system
will default. In Gersbach & Wenzelburger (2003), we have shown numerically that
bank defaults in such models are costly in terms of GDP and can lead to long-lasting
economic downturns. Hence, defaults in a banking system are a bad event from a
macroeconomic point of view. Indeed, most sources in the literature have shown that
the costs of actual banking crises may become very high (see e.g., Lindren, Gracia &
Saal (1996), Caprio & Klingebiel (1997), and Caprio & Honohan 1999). Our model
suggests that such crises are not a low-probability event.1
The results of the paper can be applied in different ways. In a first step we may
justify governmental intervention in banking, as otherwise competitive banking sys-
tems are prone to default. Our results are thus directly linked to the literature on
bank competition and banking regulation.2 The theoretical literature on banking is
primarily concerned with the microeconomic analysis of individual institutions and
incentive problems. Models able to address intervention policies from a macroeco-
nomic and from a system viewpoint are rare. An exception is Blum & Hellwig (1995),
who emphasize the macroeconomic importance of capital-adequacy rules by showing
that strict enforcement of capital-adequacy rules in critical states may cause a socially
harmful decline in aggregate bank loans. Moreover, Hellwig (1998) has raised a variety
of important issues when a macroeconomic perspective on banking and risk is taken.
Our analysis suggests that banking systems cannot protect themselves against defaults.
In this respect, we provide a macroeconomic argument, stating why banking systems
should be better protected against macroeconomic risks.
Our results may, however, may be interpreted in a different way. The vicious circle of
1There is an emerging body of literature that relates different types of crises, such as banking crises
with debt crises, currency crises, and asset market crashes, and suggests remedies to reduce financial
instability. See, for instance, Bernanke (1983), Mishkin (1996), Kaminsky & Reinhart (1998), Chang
& Velasco (1998), Sachs & Radelet (1998), Caballero & Krishnamurthy (1998), Rogoff (1999).
2Comprehensive surveys with different emphasis can be found in Bhattacharya & Thakor (1993),
Dewatripont & Tirole (1994), Hellwig (1994), Freixas & Rochet (1997) and Bhattacharya, Boot &
Thakor (1998).
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declining bank capital and risk premia suggests that it may be difficult to eliminate
banking instabilities by regulation, as banks may default with any initial level of bank
capital. Hence, managing banking crises should be an integral part of both banking
regulation and macroeconomic policy.3 Our model suggests that an essential task in
banking regulation might be to enforce a different approach to the pricing of macroe-
conomic risk in the banking system, which would avoid the negative relationship of
risk premia and bank capital. Whether banking regulation in the form of Basel II will
be able to eliminate the vicious circle described above will be an important task for
future research.
Our model introduces premia for macroeconomic risks into dynamic general equilib-
rium frameworks with financial intermediation. It follows the tradition of business
cycle models with financial intermediation initiated by Uhlig (1995) and continued by
Gersbach & Wenzelburger (2001) (see also Williamson (1987)). Our most important
innovation in this paper is a dynamic macroeconomic model of banking where free
entry and exit determine premia for aggregate risk.
The paper follows the literature on how credit constraints interact with aggregate
economic activity. Starting from the seminal work of Bernanke & Gertler (1983),
Greenwald & Stiglitz (1993), Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) and Matsuyama (2004), the
literature has examined dynamic general equilibrium models in which informational
frictions in capital markets cause temporary shocks to technology, thus generating
large and persistent fluctuations in output and asset prices. However, none of these
models contain a financial intermediation sector with balance sheet of its own, so the
problem of a banking crisis does not occur in this literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the model. In
Section 3, we discuss the intermediation problem. In Section 4, we establish the ex-
istence of temporary equilibria with financial intermediation. In Section 5 we set up
a random dynamical system governing the evolution of bank capital. In Section 6 we
analyze the relationship between default probabilities and risk premia, and in Section
7 the default risks of the banking system.
3A macroeconomic perspective of such policy measures are described e.g. in Gersbach & Wenzel-
burger (2003).
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2 Model
We consider an overlapping generations model with financial intermediation, in which
agents live for two periods. Time is infinite in the forward direction and divided into
discrete periods indexed by t. There is one physical good that can be used for consump-
tion or investment. Each generation consists of a continuum of agents with two-period
lives, indexed by [0, 1]. Each individual of each generation receives an endowment e of
goods when young and none when old. The endowment may be thought of as being
obtained from short-term production with inelastically supplied labor. Generations are
divided into two classes. A fraction η of the individuals are potential entrepreneurs,
the rest 1− η of the population are consumers. Potential entrepreneurs and consumers
differ in that only the former have access to investment projects.
Consumers are endowed with preferences over consumption in the two periods of their
lives. Let u(c1t , c
2
t ) be a standard intertemporal utility function of a consumer, with
c1t , c
2
t denoting youthful and old-age consumption respectively of a consumer born in
period t.4 Given an endowment e when young and a deposit interest rate rd, each
young household saves the amount s(rd). Aggregate savings of all households is then
S(rd) = (1− η)s(rd).
Each entrepreneur has access to a production project that converts period-t goods into
period-t + 1 goods. For simplicity, we assume that potential entrepreneurs are risk
neutral and consume only when old. e + I are the funds required for an investment
project. An entrepreneur must borrow I units of the goods in order to undertake
the investment project. The entrepreneurs are heterogeneous and indexed by a quality
parameter i which is uniformly distributed on [0, η]. If an entrepreneur of type i obtains
additional resources I and decides to invest, his investment returns in the next period
amount to
fi(q, e + I) = (1 + i) qf(e + I),
where f denotes a standard atemporal neoclassical production function. The parameter
q ∈ R+ is subject to exogenous stochastic noise governed by an iid process on a compact
interval [q, q].
4In view of the applications, it is straightforward to replace the OG structure by infinitely living
agents who optimize myopically.
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There are n(n > 1) identical banks, indexed by j = 1, . . . , n, owned by entrepreneurs.
Banks finance entrepreneurs and maximize profits accruing to current shareholders.
Transfer of ownership of banks to the next generation occurs through bequests. We
assume that the number of banks is large and that the banking industry is perfectly
competitive, i.e., banks take deposit and loan rates as given. Moreover, banks freely
decide whether or not to offer their intermediation services. This polar assumption
is made on purpose since we want to examine to what extent a perfectly competitive
banking system with free entry and exit is vulnerable to banking crises.
Each bank j can sign deposit contracts D(rd), where 1 + rd is the repayment offered
for 1 unit of resources. Loan contracts of bank j are denoted by C(rc), while 1 + rc is
the repayment required from entrepreneurs for 1 unit of funds. All deposits and loan
contracts last for one period. Banks act as delegated monitors as depositors cannot
observe the quality of investment projects and whether entrepreneurs invest or consume
their funds. Banks are assumed to be able to secure both investment by entrepreneurs,
who have obtained a loan, and the liquidation value in case of default. There are
various ways to formulate moral hazard and monitoring technologies justifying this
assumption. Such detailed justifications for the current model set-up are provided in
Gersbach & Uhlig (2004) and Gersbach & Wenzelburger (2001).
3 Financial intermediation
3.1 Sequence of events
We introduce intermediation that takes place in each period. We drop the time index
in this section. The time-line of actions in the economy within a typical period t is as
follows:
1. Old entrepreneurs pay back with limited liability. The current deficits or reserves
are determined. Reserves are distributed among shareholders according to payout
rules.
2. Given rd and rc, banks decide whether to exit and to save their reserves. If they
stay in business, they offer their intermediation services.
6
3. Consumers and entrepreneurs decide which contracts to accept. Resources are
exchanged and banks pay back old depositors.
4. Young entrepreneurs produce subject to a macroeconomic shock.
In order to simplify the exposition, we set the costs of intermediation to zero.5 We
make the following assumptions regarding the behavior of banks. Banks operate un-
der limited liability. Depositors randomly choose a bank that offers its intermediation
services in order to save. Similarly, entrepreneurs applying for a loan contract choose
banks randomly. Throughout the paper we assume that aggregate uncertainty is can-
celed out when depositors and entrepreneurs randomly choose banks. That is, each
active bank obtains the same amount of deposits and loans.6 Loans are constrained
by the amount of deposits obtained. If entrepreneurs applying for loans were rejected,
they will randomly choose a bank and save.
Finally, banks can exit completely, but cannot partially reduce their equity while still
offering their intermediation services. The assumption can be justified in several ways.
First, it could be derived as an equilibrium phenomenon when banks are allowed to
reduce their equity. For instance, consumers, upon observing the levels of equity, may
decide to deposit their resources only at banks that have the highest level of equity
because those banks have the lowest default probability. In such cases, banks will not
reduce equity. Second, banks that offer their services are required by regulation to hold
a certain amount of equity. Basel I and in the future Basel II are regulatory frameworks
that stipulate such capital requirements for banks. Third, reducing equity may harm
the efficiency of the monitoring function of a bank and thus may create losses which
may make the reduction unprofitable.
Entrepreneurs are price takers and operate under limited liability. Under the no-
rationing assumption, all entrepreneurs applying for a loan contract randomly choose
a bank that offers intermediation services. Given a loan interest rate rc, the expected
5Such costs would include monitoring expenses of banks. If intermediation costs are a fixed amount
per loan, the equilibrium value of the spread rc − rd in all of our results would increase accordingly.
6The exact construction of individual randomness so that this statement holds can be found in
Alos-Ferrer (1999). We could also rely on the weaker forms of the strong law of large numbers
developed in Uhlig (1996) and Al-Najjar (1996), where independence of individual random variables
can be assumed and aggregate stability is the limit of an economy with finite characteristics.
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profit of an investing entrepreneur i is
Π(i, rc) :=
∫
R+
max{(1 + i)q f(e + I)− I(1 + rc), 0}µ(dq), (1)
where µ denotes the probability distribution of the shocks. Note that Π(i, rc) is mono-
tonically increasing in quality levels i and monotonically decreasing in loan rates rc.
To obtain a loan contract of size I, entrepreneurs are required to invest all of their
equity e. They face a binary decision problem, such that a risk-neutral entrepreneur
with quality parameter i ∈ [0, η] will invest, if
Π(i, rc) ≥ e (1 + rd).
Banks do not have to fear low-quality entrepreneurs applying for loans as they are
always better off with saving endowments. Moreover, banks are able to secure repay-
ments.
3.2 Temporary equilibria
In order to derive the intermediation equilibrium, we assume that banks are bailed out
and deposits are ensured. Obviously, the feasibility of bail-outs must be checked for all
possible scenarios. To this end, we assume that savings are never sufficient to fund all
entrepreneurs, so that
S(rd) = (1− η) s(rd) < η I for all rd ≥ 0.
Let d denote the current capital base of the banking system. An individual bank has
an amount of equity of dj = fracdn. As all banks are assumed to be identical we will
formulate the equilibrium conditions for the whole banking system and hence we will
focus directly on the evolution of the aggregate bank capital d.
There are two boundary values for d. Let Smax := max{S(r
d) : rd ≥ 0} denote
maximal aggregate savings and set d := ηI − Smax > 0 for an upper bound for the
capital bases. If d > d, we assume that banks pay excess reserves to bank owners
according to pay-out rules. On the other hand, if d ≤ 0, then the capital base of the
banking system has vanished, causing a default of the system.
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For these reasons, the intermediation problem arises only when d ∈ (0, d]. For each
d ∈ (d, d] and each rd ≥ 0 there exists a unique critical entrepreneur iG ∈ [0, η], given
by
iG = iG(d, r
d) :=
ηI − S(rd)− d
e + I
, (2)
such that savings are balanced by investments, that is,
S(rd) + e iG(d, r
d) + d =
[
η − iG(d, r
d)
]
I, d ∈ (0, d]. (3)
Let d ∈ (0, d] be the current level of reserves (deficits) at the beginning of an arbitrary
period. Banks raise funds S(rd) + e iG(d, r
d) that have to be payed back with interest
at the end of the subsequent period. In a competitive equilibrium, these funds will
have to satisfy (3).
Banks lend
[
η− iG
]
I to firms and will receive payments P = P
(
iG, q, r
c
)
at the end of
the period, given by
P
(
iG, q, r
c
)
=
∫ η
iG
min
{
(1 + i)q f(e + I) , I
(
1 + rc
)}
di, (4)
where iG = iG(d, r
d). Given a pair of interest rates rd, rc, the balance sheet of the
banking system is given by a function G(·, q, rd, rc) : (0, d] → R, defined by
G(d, q, rd, rc) = P
(
iG(d, r
d), q, rc
)
−
[
S(rd) + e iG(d, r
d)
]
(1 + rd), (5)
such that for each shock shock q and each rc, rd ≥ 0, G(d, q, rd, rc) is the capital base
of the banking system at the end of the period.
Suppose d > 0. A temporary equilibrium with financial intermediation in a particular
period is a pair of interest rates
(
rd
∗
, rc
∗
)
such that
(i) loan demand equals loan supply;
(ii) no bank exits and no bank enters the market;
(iii) firms take optimal investment and saving decisions.
Writing
G+(d, q, rd, rc) = max
{
G(d, q, rd, rc), 0
}
,
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the expected profit of banks for interest rates rc, rd which operate under limited li-
ability is E
[
G+(d, q, rd, rc)
]
. More formally, a temporary equilibrium with financial
intermediation is defined as follows.
Definition 1
Let d ∈ (0, d] denote the capital base of the banking system operating under limited
liability. A temporary equilibrium with nancial intermediation (TEFI) is a pair of
interest rates (rd
∗
, rc
∗
) such that the following conditions hold:
E
[
G+(d, · , rd
∗
, rc
∗
)
]
= d (1 + rd
∗
) (6)
Π
(
iG(d, r
d
∗
), rc
∗
)
= e (1 + rd
∗
) (7)
S(rd
∗
) + e iG(d, r
d
∗
) + d =
[
η − iG(d, r
d
∗
)
]
I (8)
Condition (6) is the no-exit and no-entry condition for banks. Of course, the condition
has to be applied to an individual bank. As the condition for an individual bank is
obtained by dividing both sides in equation (6) through the number of banks, it is
convenient to work directly with the aggregate condition as we will do throughout the
paper.
Condition (7) states that all entrepreneurs i ≥ iG(d, r
d
∗
) invest, while all entrepreneurs
i < iG(d, r
d
∗
) save. The spread rc
∗
− rd
∗
represents the premium banks obtain for bearing
macroeconomic risks. For the sake of completeness the definition of TEFI includes (8),
stating that aggregate demand for loans
[
η− iG(d, r
d
∗
)
]
I is balanced by loan supply on
the left hand side of equation (8).
Condition (8) determines the critical investing entrepreneur iG(d, r
d
∗
) independently of
equilibrium loan interest rates. Assuming that aggregate saving S(rd) is increasing in
rd, we see that iG is decreasing in d and r
d. In both cases more resources are available
which induce entrepreneurs with lower quality levels to invest. This is the case despite
the fact that saving endowments becomes more attractive for increasing deposit interest
rates rd.
The temporary equilibrium notion of Definition 1 assumes that banks operate under
limited liability. This is a standard assumption when bank managers act in the inter-
est of equity holders. However, it is also conceivable that banks (or their managers)
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internalize negative realizations of equity. This may happen, for instance, if bank man-
agers suffer non-pecuniary punishments such as a loss of reputation or a loss of career
opportunities when they default. Or bank managers may be punished by regulators
as soon as their equity becomes negative. It is straightforward to define a temporary
equilibrium notion for a banking system with full liability by modifying the no-entry
condition (6) to
E
[
G(d, · , rd
∗
, rc
∗
)
]
= d (1 + rd
∗
). (9)
4 Existence of temporary equilibria
In this section we establish the existence of temporary equilibria with financial in-
termediation. Assume for the remainder of the paper that the productivity of the
entrepreneur with quality level η
2
is on average greater than unity, that is,(
1 + η
2
)
E[q]f(e + I)
I
> 1
We now obtain the desired existence result.
Theorem 1
Consider a competitive banking system operating under limited liability. Let the fol-
lowing conditions be satised:
(i) The productivity of the entrepreneur with quality level η
2
is on average greater
than unity and there exists an interest rate rd with
0 < rd <
(
1 + η
2
)
E[q]f(e + I)
I
, (10)
such that Π(0, 0) > e(1 + rd) > Π(η, rd).
(ii) Aggregate saving S(rd) is non-decreasing in rd and
S(rd) + η e > (1 + rd)S ′(rd) for all 0 ≤ rd ≤ rd.
(iii) Let rc0 > 0 denote the loan interest rate with Π(0, r
c
0) = e, such that the en-
trepreneur with the lowest quality level i = 0 will invest for rd = 0. Assume that
average repayments to banks are suciently high, so that
E
[
P
(
0, · , rc0
)]
ηI
≥ 1.
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Then for each d ∈ (0, d] there exists a unique temporary equilibrium with nancial
intermediation (TEFI), given by the interest rates
(
rd
∗
(d), rc
∗
(d)
)
∈ [0, rd
UB
]× [rc
LB
, rc
UB
].
The lower and upper bound rc
LB
> 0, rd
UB
, and rc
UB
are dened by
Π(0, rc
LB
) = e (1 + rc
LB
), Π(η, rd
UB
) = e (1 + rd
UB
), and Π(η, rc
UB
) = e,
respectively.
PSfrag replacements
45◦
rc
rd
rc
∗
(d)
rd
∗
(d)
Condition (6)
Condition (7)
Figure 1: Existence and uniqueness of a TEFI for a given d ∈ (0, d].
The result of Theorem 1 the proof of which is given in the appendix is illustrated in
Figure 1. For an arbitrary capital base d ∈ (0, d], the figures depicts interest rates satis-
fying the no-entry condition (6) and interest rates satisfying the indifference condition
(7). A TEFI is characterized by the intersection point of these two curves. Theorem 1
is the foundation of our further analysis. Temporary equilibria exist since savings and
loan supply increase with the deposit rate, while the demand for loans depends neg-
atively on the loan rate. Observe that Condition (ii) induces an upper bound for the
savings elasticity of consumers, which is automatically satisfied for an inelastic savings
function as well as for a savings function with elasticities less than unity. By setting
an appropriate spread rc
∗
− rd
∗
banks earn returns on equity which are high enough to
ensure that there is no incentive to exit. It is intuitively clear that risk premia must
be non-negative. Formally we have:
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Corollary 1
The equilibrium deposit rate rd
∗
(d) is decreasing in d ∈ (0, d]. Moreover, risk premia
are non-negative such that rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d) ≥ 0 for all d ∈ (0, d].
The proof is given in the appendix. To complete our investigation of existence, we
consider the case of full liability. As the next lemma shows, the existence of temporary
equilibria is obtained in this case as well.
Lemma 1
Consider a banking system operating under full liability and suppose that the hypothe-
ses of Theorem 1 are satised. Then for each d ∈ (0, d], there exists a unique temporary
equilibrium with nancial intermediation
(
rd+(d), r
c
+(d)
)
∈ [0, rd
UB
] × [rc
LB
, rc
UB
], where
the bounds rc
LB
, rd
UB
, and rc
UB
are given in Theorem 1. Moreover, the interest rates
satisfy
rd+(d) ≤ r
d
∗
(d) and rc+(d) ≥ r
c
∗
(d)
with
(
rd
∗
(d), rc
∗
(d)
)
denoting the TEFI given in Theorem 1.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in the appendix. An immediate consequence of Lemma
1 is that risk premia of a competitive banking system with limited liability are lower
than those of banks operating under full liability. The reason is intuitively clear. With
full liability the free exit condition forces banks to make higher profits in order to cover
the greater risk for potential losses. This requires higher risk premia. Since, under
Lemma 1, deposit rates are lower and loan rates are higher under full liability, both
depositors and entrepreneurs will have to bear the additional risk banks are exposed
to under full liability.
5 Evolution of the banking system
In this section we describe the evolution of capital in the banking system. Adverse
macroeconomic shocks may lead to bankruptcy of entrepreneurs and to low repayments
to banks, thus affecting the evolution of bank capital. Let dt ∈ (0, d] denote the capital
base of the banking system at the beginning of some period t, where we allow the
banking system to start with an arbitrary level d0 ∈ (0, d]. At the beginning of period
t, banks raise funds S
(
rd
∗
(dt)
)
+ e iG
(
dt, r
d
∗
(dt)
)
that have to be paid back with interest
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at the end of that period. Writing i∗(dt) := iG
(
dt, r
d
∗
(dt)
)
for the critical entrepreneur
in a competitive equilibrium, these funds must satisfy
S
(
rd
∗
(dt)
)
+ e i∗(dt) + dt = I
[
η − i∗(dt)
]
, dt ∈ (0, d]. (11)
The corresponding equilibrium interest rates rc
∗
(dt), r
d
∗
(dt) are given by Theorem 1, such
that given the shock qt, the new level of reserves (deficits) dt+1 is determined by
dt+1 = min
{
G∗
(
dt, qt
)
, d
}
, dt ∈ (0, d], (12)
where the map G∗ is defined as follows. Using the definition of the balance sheet of the
banking system (5), for each q the function G?(·, q) : (0, d] → (−∞, d] is defined by
G∗(d, q) := G
(
d, q, rd
∗
(d), rc
∗
(d)
)
= P
(
i∗(d), q, r
c
∗
(d)
)
−
[
S
(
rd
∗
(d)
)
+ e i∗(d)
] (
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
.
Note that we account for the fact that excess reserves above d will be distributed among
old entrepreneurs only. Thus possible dividend payments will affect neither savings nor
investment decisions.
The map (12) is continuous in both arguments and describes a random difference
equation. Since {qt}t∈N is an iid process, the sequence of reserves {dt}t∈N generated
by (12) is a Markov process. In particular, this implies that conditional expectations
satisfy
Et[dt+1] ≡ E[dt+1|dt] = E
[
max
{
G∗
(
dt, ·
)
, d
}]
, t ∈ N,
cf. Bauer (1991, p. 134). If dt+1 ≥ 0, then all depositors have been repaid and dt+1
represents the banks’ reserves at the beginning of period t + 1. If dt+1 < 0, then the
banks incur losses and dt+1 is the amount of liabilities that could not be covered by
loan repayments of entrepreneurs. In such a case the banking system has negative
equity and is bankrupt.
6 Risk premia and default probabilities
Having established the existence of temporary equilibria, we investigate the role of risk
premia in the default probability of entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur with quality level
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i enters bankruptcy, if she is unable to fully pay back her credit, that is, if
I(1 + rc) > q(1 + i)f(e + I).
The entrepreneur with the lowest quality level who is not bankrupt after encountering
the shock q is given by
iB = iB(iG, r
c, q) :=


iG if q ≥ qNB(iG, r
c),
I(1+rc)
qf
− 1 if qTB(r
c) < q < qNB(iG, r
c),
η if q ≤ qTB(r
c),
(13)
where
qNB(iG, r
c) :=
I(1 + rc)
(1 + iG)f(e + I)
and qTB(r
c) :=
I(1 + rc)
(1 + η)f(e + I)
. (14)
Observe that no entrepreneur enters bankruptcy and aggregate losses of banks are zero,
if shocks are sufficiently positive, q ≥ qNB(iG, r
c). For shocks qTB(r
c) < q < qNB(iG, r
c),
all investing entrepreneurs with quality levels iG ≤ i < iB(iG, r
c, q) enter bankruptcy,
whereas entrepreneurs with quality levels i ≥ iB(iG, r
c, q) pay back their loans fully.
On the other hand, all entrepreneurs enter bankruptcy if q ≤ qTB(r
c) and losses are
maximal. Solving the integral in (4), firms’ repayments P = P (iG, q, r
c) are
P =
{
[η − iG]I(1 + r
c)− qf(e + I) 1
2
[iB − iG]
2 if q > qTB(r
c),
[η − iG]
(
1 + 1
2
(η + iG)
)
qf(e + I) if q ≤ qTB(r
c).
(15)
implying that firms’ repayments are determined by total repayments minus losses due
to bankruptcies. Setting
rc :=
(1 + η)qf(e + I)
I
− 1 (16)
with q denoting the highest possible shock, we see that qTB(r
c) < q whenever rc < rc.
Since Π(i, rc) = 0 for all i ∈ [0, η], it follows from the definition of the maximal loan
interest rate in Theorem 1 that rcUB < r
c, such that in a TEFI, entrepreneurs with
sufficiently high quality do not default with positive probability.
It is now straightforward to formalize the default probability of entrepreneurs in a
TEFI. For an arbitrary capital base d ∈ (0, d], if qNB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d)
)
> q, then the prob-
ability that entrepreneurs go bankrupt conditional on d is
Prob
(
iB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d), ·
)
> i∗(d)
)
=
∫ qNB(i∗(d),rc∗(d))
q
µ(dq).
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If qNB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d)
)
≤ q, then the probability that an entrepreneur enters bankruptcy
conditional on d is zero. Since qNB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d)
)
≥ qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
, the probability
for bankruptcies is positive independently of the capital base if
qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
> q.
In this case the entrepreneur with quality level iG(0, 0) enters bankruptcy for shocks
close to q.
We are now ready to investigate how a competitive banking system incorporates
macroeconomic default risks of entrepreneurs. We start with some simple observa-
tions.
Proposition 1
Let d ∈ (0, d] be arbitrary. Then the following holds true.
(i) If the probability for bankruptcies of entrepreneurs is zero, i.e.
qNB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d)
)
≤ q,
then the risk premium for banks is zero, rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d) = 0.
(ii) If the probability for bankruptcies of entrepreneurs is strictly positive, i.e.
qNB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d)
)
> q,
then the risk premium for banks is strictly positive, rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d) > 0.
Proposition 1 confirms the intuition that a competitive banking system will not charge
risk premia if there is zero risk for bankruptcies of entrepreneurs because the return
on equity is rd
∗
. As soon as the probability for bankruptcies of entrepreneurs is strictly
positive, Proposition 1 shows that strictly positive risk premia ensure higher profits.
For the case q > qTB
(
rc
∗
(d)
)
we can represent the evolution of bank capital in a par-
ticularly convenient way. Using the balance condition (11) and the repayments of
entrepreneurs (15), we see that the map G∗ which drives the evolution of bank capital
takes the form
G∗(d, q) = I
[
η − i∗(d)
][
rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d)
]
+ d
(
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
− 1
2
qf(e + I)
[
iB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d), q
)
− i∗(d)
]2 (17)
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whenever q > qTB
(
rc
∗
(d)
)
. In this case iB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d), q
)
< η and there are en-
trepreneurs who repay their loans fully. Eq. (17) reflects the fact that risk premia serve
as a buffer against losses due to bankruptcies, which occur as soon as iB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d), q
)
> i∗(d). If risk premia become too small, large losses may cause a default of the
banking system.
We will show next that risk premia will become arbitrarily small if the capital base of
the banking system tends toward zero. Assuming that qNB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d)
)
> q for small d,
the probability of bankruptcies of entrepreneurs is positive for small d. These defaults
of entrepreneurs will be responsible for vanishing risk premia. Consider the case in
which for d ∈ (0, d] sufficiently small, the productivity of entrepreneurs is sufficiently
high, so that no entrepreneur enters bankruptcy with positive probability. Using the
definition in (14), we see that this is the case if
qNB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d)
)
≤ qNB
(
iG(d, r
d
UB), r
c
UB
)
< q for sufficiently small d > 0.
We are now in a position to state the following proposition.
Theorem 2
Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, let qNB
(
iG(0, r
d
UB
), rc
UB
)
< q. Then the risk premia
will vanish with a vanishing capital base, that is,
lim
d→0
[
rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d)
]
= 0.
Theorem 2 has important implications. If a banking system has lost most of its capital,
the risk premia decline and hence the risk of a further decline of bank capital rises. At
the limit where bank capital approaches zero, the risk premium vanishes. In order to
explain this result, we observe that for a small level of bank capital a positive premium
implies a very large return on equity ex post if the macroeconomic shock turns out
to be sufficiently favorable. In such circumstances, banks earn more from the vast
majority of loans than the deposit rate. As equity is small in relation to deposits and
loans, return on equity becomes very large. Since negative shocks imply zero equity, a
small risk premium is sufficient to generate the ex ante return on equity demanded by
shareholders.
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7 Default of the banking system
In this section we investigate the possibility of a default of the banking system. We will
show that the probability for a default of the banking system is positive if the capital
base is below a certain threshold, which will be denoted by dcrit. This result is a conse-
quence of the fact that risk premia may become arbitrarily small, as shown in Theorem
2. If a bank’s capital base is too low, then banks will be unable to cover losses from
bankruptcies of entrepreneurs. To formulate our next result, recall that bankruptcies of
entrepreneurs occur with positive probability for all d ∈ (0, d], if qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
> q.
Proposition 2
Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, suppose that qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
> q. Then there
exists a critical capital level dcrit ∈ (0, d] such that the banking system defaults with
positive probability, that is,
P(G∗(d, ·) < 0) > 0 whenever d < dcrit.
The proof of Proposition 2 is to be found in the appendix. The underlying economic
forces at work in Proposition 2 can be described as follows. A level of bank capital
below dcrit makes the banking system vulnerable to default in two ways. First, the
buffer against defaults of entrepreneurs is small. Second, the risk premium is small,
and even intermediate macroeconomic shocks may lead to a decline of bank capital.
We will show next that the banking system will default in finite time with probability
one. Again, if the productivity of entrepreneurs is so low that G∗(d, q) < 0 for shocks
q ≤ qTB(r
c
LB), then the monotonicity of the maps d 7→ G∗(d, q), q ≤ qTB(r
c
LB) implies
an immediate bankruptcy of the banking system as soon as the event q ≤ qTB(r
c
LB)
occurs. We therefore assume in the following that G∗(d, q) > 0, such that a sufficiently
high capital base will insure against bankruptcies of banks.
The argument is based upon the following line of reasoning. We will show that there
exists a critical shock qcrit > q such that the capital base will decrease for shocks below
qcrit, i.e.,
G∗(d, q) < d for all d ∈ (0, d], q ≤ qcrit.
18
Then a series of sufficiently many shocks qt, . . . , qt+τ below qcrit will lead to a series of
decreasing capital bases
dt+1 = G∗(dt, qt) > · · · > dt+1+τ = G∗(dt+τ , qt+τ )
that will finally take on a value below zero, thus causing a default of the banking
system. Let T0 denote the first time for which the capital base of the banking system
has vanished and the system has accumulated losses, that is, the first time for which
dT0 < 0. In the next proposition we will show that the event T0 < ∞ occurs with
probability one, implying that the banking system will default in finite time with
probability one.
Theorem 3
Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, let qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
> q and suppose that
P
(
iG(0, 0), q, r
c
UB
)
I
[
η − iG(0, 0)
] < 1 + S
(
rd
∗
(d)
)
Iη
rd
∗
(d) for all q ≤ qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
.
Then for an arbitrary initial capital level d0 ∈ (0, d] the banking system will default in
nite time with probability one, that is, P(T0 < ∞) = 1.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in the appendix. Theorem 3 implies that a banking
system cannot protect itself from a default which will occur with certainty if the return
on debt P
(
iG(0, 0), q, r
c
UB
)
/
(
I
[
η − iG(0, 0)
])
is too low. In this case a vicious circle
starts. Repeated negative macroeconomic shocks lower the equity of banks until it
ultimately lies below the critical level dcrit. Further negative macroeconomic shocks
then lead to a downward spiral of bank capital. As equity declines, the risk premium
decreases, which in turn increases the probability of further declines in bank capital.
Over time the banking system will default.
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8 Discussion and Conclusion
The results of the present paper suggest that vulnerabilities of a banking system may
build up over time while at the same time risk premia decline. This creates the danger
of large-scale defaults of banks. Apart from the policy implications outlined in the
introduction, we hope that the current framework offers avenues for further research
which are briefly outlined in this section.
Our analysis rests on symmetric information for all market participants. In recent
proposals to revise the 1988 accord on bank capital adequacy, regulators have placed
great emphasis on the disclosures by banks in order to allow market discipline to operate
effectively (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1999). In order to examine the
role of public information models with private and public signals about repayment
risks across banks in the spirit of Hellwig (2000), Morris & Shin (2002, 2004) and
Shin (2003) could be combined with the model in this paper. Since public information
conveys information about fundamentals as well as can serve as a focal point for beliefs
(see Morris & Shin (2004)), the effect of public information on risk premia in banking
is likely to be ambiguous. How public information in such a context would affect the
default risk of banks is therefore an open question.
Moreover, one could allow for international financial markets following Matsuyama
(2002, 2004). He has shown that financial market globalization may be symmetry-
breaking and introduce endogenous components of heterogeneities across countries.
Combining these insights with the current model may offer an approach that can ex-
plain why banking crises are so prevalent in poor countries.
At another level, one might ask whether it is possible to improve the protection of
banks from macroeconomic risks. How securities, deposit, and loan contracts might be
designed to reduce macroeconomic risks on the balance sheets of banks appears to be
one of the most important research issues in the light of the present findings.
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A Appendix
Before listing the main proofs, we present the following result.
Proposition 3
Let rc ≥ 0 be arbitrary. Then for each q ∈ R+, the average repayment per unit of loan
P
(
i, q, rc
)
/([η − i]I) is non-decreasing in quality levels i ∈ [0, η].
Proof .
Let i1 < i0 ∈ [0, η] and q ∈ R+ be arbitrary but fixed. According to the mean value
theorem there exists j0 ∈ [i0, η] with
P
(
i0, q, r
c
)
[η − i0]I
= min
{
(1 + j0) q f(e + I)/I, 1 + r
c
)}
. (18)
Moreover, it is straightforward to verify
P
(
i1, q, r
c
)
≤ [η − i1] min
{
(1 + j0) q f(e + I)/I, 1 + r
c
)}
. (19)
Then (18) and (19) imply
P
(
i1, q, r
c
)
[η − i1]I
≤ min
{
(1 + j0) q f(e + I)/I, 1 + r
c
)}
=
P
(
i0, q, r
c
)
[η − i0]I
.
Since i1 < i0 were arbitrary, this completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1.
We will show that for each d ∈ (0, d] the two equilibrium conditions (6) and (7) define
curves in the rd − rc plane whose unique intersection point is the TEFI.
Step 1. Let d ∈ (0, d] and rd ∈ [0, rd] be arbitrary but fixed, and consider first the
no-entry condition (6). Since
P
(
iG(d, r
d), q, rd) ≤ I
[
η − iG(d, r
d)
]
(1 + rd),
for all shocks q, it follows from (3) that
E
[
G+(d, · , rd, rd)
]
≤ d(1 + rd). (20)
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Set
rc :=
(1 + η)qf(e + I)
I
− 1 (21)
and notice that by Assumption (i), rc > 0. It is straightforward to verify that
E
[
G+(d, · , rd, rc)
]
≥ E
[
G(d, · , rd, rc)
]
> d(1 + rd). (22)
and to verify that E
[
G+(d, · , rc, rd)
]
is increasing in rc, for rc ≤ rc. The Intermediate
Value Theorem then implies for each d ∈ (0, d] and each rd ∈ [0, rd] the existence of an
interest rate rc = g(d, rd) ≥ rd such that
E
[
G+
(
d, · , rd, g(d, rd)
)]
− d(1 + rd) = 0. (23)
Moreover, g(d, rd) is a continuous function of both arguments, where each g(d, ·), d ∈
(0, d] describes a curve in the rd − rc plane.
The the no-entry condition (6) is equivalent to
E
[
max
{
P
(
iG(d, r
d), · , rc
)
I
[
η − iG(d, rd)
] − (1 + rd), −d(1 + rd)
I
[
η − iG(d, rd)
]
}]
!
= 0. (24)
By Proposition 3 and Assumption (ii), both functions in the max-operator are non-
increasing functions of d and rd. Hence rc = g(d, rd) is non-decreasing in both d and
rd.
Step 2. Consider now Condition (7) which takes the form
Π
(
iG(d, r
d), rc
)
− e (1 + rd)
!
= 0, d ∈ (0, d]. (25)
By Assumption (i), for each d ∈ (0, d], rd ∈ [0, rd],
Π
(
iG(d, r
d), 0
)
≥ Π(0, 0) > e (1 + rd) ≥ e (1 + rd).
Note that this condition holds including d = 0. On the other hand, for each i ∈ [0, η],
Π(i, rc) = 0 and Π(i, rc) is strictly decreasing for rc ≤ rc. Thus, for each d ∈ [0, d],
rd ∈ [0, rd], there exists a continuous function rc = h(d, rd) solving (25). Moreover, for
each d ∈ [0, d], rd 7→ h(d, rd) is a curve in the rd − rc plane. Since Π(i, rc) is strictly
increasing in i and iG(d, r
d) is strictly decreasing in d and rd, h(d, rd) must be strictly
decreasing in d and rd.
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Step 3. We show next that for each d ∈ (0, d], the curve h(d, ·) defined in (25) and
the curve g(d, ·) defined in (24) have a unique intersection point
(
rd
∗
(d), rc
∗
(d)
)
which
satisfies
h
(
d, rd
∗
(d)
)
= g
(
d, rd
∗
(d)
)
= rc
∗
(d)
and thus is the uniquely determined TEFI. Uniqueness of
(
rd
∗
(d), rc
∗
(d)
)
follows from
the strict monotonicity of each h(d, ·), so that we are left to prove existence.
Setting d = d and rd = 0, (24) together with Proposition 3 imply
E
[
P
(
iG(d, 0), · , g(d, 0)
)
I
[
η − iG(d, 0)
] − 1
]
≥
E
[
P
(
0, · , rc0
)]
ηI
− 1 ≥ 0.
It follows from Assumption (iii) that
rc0 ≥ g(d, 0). (26)
On the other hand, we have
Π
(
iG(d, 0), h(d, 0)
)
= e = Π(0, rc0)
and since iG(d, 0) ≥ 0, the monotonicity of Π(i, r
c) implies h(d, 0) ≥ rc0. The mono-
tonicity properties of g and h then yield
h(d, 0) ≥ h(d, 0) ≥ rc0 ≥ g(d, 0) ≥ g(d, 0). (27)
By Assumption (i) we have
Π
(
iG(0, 0), 0
)
≥ Π(0, 0) > e and Π
(
iG(0, r
d), rd
)
≤ Π(η, rd) < e(1 + rd).
As a consequence, there exists a unique rd0 ∈ (0, r
d) such that
Π
(
iG(0, r
d
0), r
d
0
)
= e(1 + rd0). (28)
Hence h(0, rd0) = r
d
0 and since h(0, r
d) is decreasing in rd, h(0, rd) < rd. The mono-
tonicity properties of g and h then imply
h(d, rd) ≤ h(0, rd) < rd ≤ g(d, rd). (29)
The existence of the desired intersection point now follows from (27) and (29) and the
Intermediate Value Theorem.
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Step 4. We will show finally that
(
rd
∗
(d), rc
∗
(d)
)
∈ [0, rdUB]× [r
c
LB, r
c
UB]. First of all, since
g(d, rd) ≥ rd ≥ 0, risk premia must be non-negative so that rc
∗
(d) ≥ rd
∗
(d) ≥ 0. For the
same reason, rd
∗
(d) ≤ rd0, where r
d
0 was given in (28). Since iG(0, r
d
0) ≤ η,
e(1 + rd0) = Π
(
iG(0, r
d
0), r
d
0
)
≤ Π(η, rd0).
It follows from the definition of rdUB and the monotonicity of Π(i, r
c) with respect to
the second argument that rd0 ≤ r
d
UB. This implies r
d
∗
(d) ∈ [0, rdUB] for all d ∈ (0, d].
Since
Π
(
iG(0, 0), h(0, 0)
)
= e = Π(η, rcUB)
and iG(0, 0) ≤ η, an upper bound for each r
c
∗
(d), d ∈ (0, d] is
rc
∗
(d) = h
(
d, rd
∗
(d)
)
≤ h(0, 0) ≤ rcUB.
On the other hand, analogous to (28) there exists a unique rd0 ∈ (0, r
d) such that
Π
(
iG(d, r
d
0), h(d, r
d
0)
)
= e(1 + rd0).
Since iG(d, r
d
0) ≥ 0, we have Π(0, r
d
0) ≤ e(1 + r
d
0). It follows from the definition of r
c
LB
and the monotonicity of Π(i, rc) with respect to the second argument that rd0 ≥ r
c
LB.
This implies that rcLB is a lower bound each r
c
∗
(d), d ∈ (0, d].
Proof of Corollary 1.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, g(d, rd) ≥ rd for all d ∈ (0, d] and all rd ∈ [0, rd],
such that rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d) ≥ 0 for each d ∈ (0, d]. Since g(d, rd) as defined by (23) is non-
decreasing in d and rd and h(d, rd) as defined by (25) is strictly decreasing in d and rd,
the equilibrium deposit rate rd
∗
(d) is decreasing in d.
Proof of Lemma 1.
The proof of Lemma 1 follows the lines of the proof of Proposition 1, only Condition
(6) has to be replaced by Condition (9).
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Step 1. Let d ∈ (0, d] and rd ∈ [0, rd] be arbitrary but fixed. Clearly, E
[
G(d, · , rd, rc)
]
is increasing for rc ≤ rc with rc defined by (21). Conditions (20) and (22) then imply
the existence of a continuous function
g˜ : (0, d]× [0, rd] → R+
such that
E
[
G
(
d, · , rd, g˜(d, rd)
)]
− d(1 + rd) = 0 (30)
for all d ∈ (0, d] and rd ∈ [0, rd]. Since
E
[
G
(
d, · , rd, rc
)]
≤ E
[
G+
(
d, · , rd, rc
)]
,
it follows from (23) and (30) that
g˜(d, rd) ≥ g(d, rd) ≥ rd, d ∈ (0, d], rd ∈ [0, rd]. (31)
Step 2. As in Theorem 1, a temporary equilibrium with intermediation under full
liability is given by an intersection point of the two curves g˜(d, ·) and h(d, ·), where the
latter was defined in (25). Analogous to Step 3 in the proof of Theorem 1, Assumption
(iii) in Theorem 1 together with the monotonicity properties of h and g˜ imply
h(d, 0) ≥ h(d, 0) ≥ rc0 ≥ g˜(d, 0) ≥ g˜(d, 0) (32)
for all d ∈ (0, d]. As before,
h(d, rd) ≤ h(0, rd) < rd ≤ g˜(d, rd) (33)
for all d ∈ (0, d], rd ∈ [0, rd]. For each d ∈ (0, d], the existence and uniqueness of the
desired intersection point
(
rd+(d), r
c
+(d)
)
∈ [0, rdUB]× [r
c
LB, r
c
UB]
now follows from (32), (33), the Intermediate Value Theorem and the corresponding
inequalities in Step 4 of the proof of Theorem 1.
Step 3. Inequality (31) implies the assertion of the lemma.
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Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) If there is zero probability for bankruptcies of entrepreneurs, then
G∗(d, q) = I
[
η − i∗(d)
][
rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d)
]
+ d
(
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
≥ 0
for all d ∈ (0, d] and all q ∈ [q, q]. This implies
E
[
G+
∗
(d, ·)
]
= I
[
η − i∗(d)
][
rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d)
]
+ d
(
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
and the equilibrium condition (7) shows that the risk premia must be zero and rc
∗
(d) =
rd
∗
(d).
(ii) Suppose, on the contrary, that risk premia were zero such that rc
∗
(d) = rd
∗
(d). Since
bankruptcies occur with positive probability, for each q < qNB(i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d)
)
,
P
(
i∗(d), q, r
d
∗
(d)
)
< I
[
η − i∗(d)
](
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
and thus
G∗(d, q) = P
(
i∗(d), q, r
d
∗
(d)
)
−
[
I
[
η − i∗(d)
]
− d
](
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
< d
(
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
.
This implies
E
[
G+
∗
(d, ·)
]
=
∫ q
qNB(i∗(d),rd∗(d))
d
(
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
µ(dq)
+
∫ qNB(i∗(d),rd∗(d))
q
G+
(
d, ·, rd
∗
(d), rd
∗
(d)
)
µ(dq)
< d
(
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
,
thus contradicting the equilibrium condition (7). Hence rc
∗
(d) > rd
∗
(d).
Proof of Theorem 2.
Given the equilibrium interest rates
(
rd
∗
(d), rc
∗
(d)
)
, the no-entry condition (6) takes the
form
E
[
G+
(
d, ·, rc
∗
(d), rd
∗
(d)
)]
= d
(
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
. (34)
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Since rd
∗
(d) is bounded for all d ∈ (0, d], the r.h.s. of (34) converges to zero if d tends
towards zero. Assume now that the assertion of the proposition is false. In this case
there must exist a small number δ > 0 such that
[
rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d)
]
≥ δ > 0 for all sufficiently small d > 0. (35)
For shocks q ≥ qNB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d)
)
, one has
G∗(d, q) = I
[
η − i∗(d)
][
rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d)
]
+ d
(
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
≥ I
[
η − i∗(d)
]
δ.
Since qNB
(
iG(0, r
d
UB), r
c
UB
)
< q, we have qNB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d)
)
< q for all sufficiently small
d. As a consequence, the l.h.s. of (34) satisfies
E
[
G+
(
d, · , rc
∗
(d), rd
∗
(d)
)]
≥
∫ q
qNB(i∗(d),rc∗(d))
µ(dq)
(
I
[
η − i∗(d)
]
δ
)
> 0
for all sufficiently small d > 0. Therefore, the equilibrium condition (34) is violated for
all sufficiently small d > 0, which contradicts the initial presumption (35).
Proof Proposition 2.
Observe first that the definition of G∗ and (5) imply that for each d ∈ (0, d],
G∗(d, q) < G∗(d, q
′) whenever q < q′ ≤ qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
.
Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that for each q ≤ qTB(r
c
LB), the map
G∗(·, q) : (0, d] → R, d 7→ G∗(d, q) (36)
is monotonically increasing. Therefore, if G∗(d, q) < 0, then the proposition holds
trivially for dcrit := d.
Assume now that G∗(d, q) ≥ 0. The evolution of the capital base is driven by the map
G∗(d, q) = I
[
η − i∗(d)
][
rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d)
]
+ d
(
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
− 1
2
qf(e + I)
[
iB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d), q
)
− i∗(d)
]2
provided that iB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d), q
)
< η. For q ≥ qNB
(
iG(d, r
d
UB), r
c
UB
)
, we have
G∗(d, q) = I
[
η − i∗(d)
][
rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d)
]
+ d
(
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
≥ 0, d ∈ (0, d].
27
Using Theorem 2 and the boundedness of the equilibrium interest rates, it follows that
lim
d→0
G∗(d, q) = 0 for all q ≥ qNB
(
iG(d, r
d
UB), r
c
UB
)
.
On the other hand, for each sufficiently low shock, i.e. for q ≤ q < qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
,
we have
iB
(
i∗(d), r
c
∗
(d), q
)
> i∗(d) for all d ∈ (0, d]
implying that
lim
d→0
G∗(d, q) < 0 at least for q ≤ q < qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
. (37)
It follows from the continuity of the map G∗ and (37) that there exists a unique dcrit ∈
(0, d] with G∗(dcrit, q) = dcrit. The monotonicity property (36) shows that G∗(d, q) < 0
for all d < dcrit and all sufficiently low shocks q. This proves the proposition.
Proof Theorem 3.
Let d ∈ (0, d] be arbitrary and recall i∗(d) = iG
(
d, rd
∗
(d)
)
. It is straightforward to see
that G∗(d, q) < d is equivalent to
P
(
i∗(d), q, r
c
∗
(d)
)
I
[
η − i∗(d)
] < 1 +
(
S
(
rd
∗
(d)
)
+ ei∗(d)
I
[
η − i∗(d)
]
)
rd
∗
(d). (38)
By Theorem 1, the r.h.s. of (38) is bounded from below by
1 +
S
(
rd
∗
(d)
)
Iη
rd
∗
(d).
Since iG(d, r
d) is decreasing in d and rd, by Proposition 3, the l.h.s. of (38) is bounded
from above by
P
(
iG(0, 0), q, r
c
UB
)
I
[
η − iG(0, 0)
] .
Thus (38) holds for all d ∈ (0, d] and all q ≤ q ≤ qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
showing that
G∗(d, q) < d for all d ∈ (0, d], q ≤ q ≤ qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
. (39)
As in the proof of Proposition 2, there exists dcrit ∈ (0, d], defined by
G∗
(
dcrit, qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
))
= dcrit,
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such that
G∗(d, q) < 0 for all d < dcrit, q ≤ qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
. (40)
For d˜0 = d, define recursively
d˜t+1 := G∗
(
d˜t, qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
))
, t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
Equations (39) and (40) imply that there exists a natural number τ > 0 such that
d˜τ+1 < 0. This observation shows that for arbitrary dt0 ∈ (0, d] in an arbitrary period
t0, a series of at most τ shocks qt0 , . . . , qt0+τ ≤ qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
will lead to the event
dt0+τ+1 < 0, where
dt+1 = G∗(dt, qt), t = t0, . . . , t0 + τ.
Since the shock process {qt}t∈N is ergodic, the event
qt0 , . . . , qt0+τ ≤ qNB
(
iG(0, 0), r
c
LB
)
, t0 < ∞
will occur with probability one. Setting T0 = t0 + τ , this proves the theorem.
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